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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4775
With growing international skilled labor mobility, 
education and migration decisions have become 
increasingly inter-related, and potentially have a large 
impact on the growth trajectories of source countries, 
through their effects on labor supply, savings, or the cost 
of education. The authors develop a generic dynamic 
general equilibrium model to analyze the education-
migration nexus in a consistent framework. They use the 
model as a laboratory to test empirical conditions for 
the existence of net brain gain, that is, greater domestic 
accumulation of human capital (in per capita terms) 
with greater migration of skilled workers. The results 
This paper—a product of Development Economics Vice Presidency (DEC)—is part of a larger effort in the department to 
analyze policy-relevant topics rigorously with the best available information to support decision making. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at sdessus@
worldbank.org.  
suggest that although some structural parameters can 
favor simultaneously greater human capital accumulation 
and greater skilled migration—such as high ratio of 
remittances over domestic incomes, high dependency 
ratios in migrant households, low dependency ratios 
in source countries, increasing returns to scale in the 
education sector, technological transfers and export 
market access with Diasporas, and efficient financial 
markets—this does not necessarily mean that greater 
migration encourages the constitution of greater stocks of 
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I. Introduction  
Following a first wave of interest in the 1970s,
1 the literature on the impact of 
migration on sending countries was recently revived with the rise of international 
migration – and related financial flows – in the 1990s of skilled workers in particular
2. A 
first branch of the literature
3, using micro data (such as household budget surveys), 
generally concludes that there is a statistically significant impact of migration and 
remittances on economic welfare, investment and education. A second branch
4, using 
global general equilibrium models, underlines the importance of remittances in the newly 
emerging global finance architecture, and suggests potentially large welfare impacts of 
lower restrictions on migration flows. A third branch, though, estimating reduced forms 
on cross-country samples, is more nuanced on the net impact of remittances on economic 
growth
5. 
The empirical literature is nevertheless less abundant when it comes to the 
analysis of migration and brain drain issues at the country-wide level, where policy 
decisions are most generally made. Indeed, micro-based approaches cannot capture the 
macro-economic impact of migration decisions, nor can they consistently assess the 
interdependency of important macro-economic phenomena influenced by migration and 
remittances
6. For instance, while migration possibilities and remittances might affect 
education decisions at the micro level, they can also simultaneously affect relative prices 
(e.g, the skill premium, the cost of education, or the real exchange rate) – hence the 
environment in which micro-economic decisions are being made. Furthermore, micro-
based approaches are generally static (often in the absence of panel data), limiting the 
possibility to assess the long term impact of investment and migration decisions on long 
term macro-economic or demographic outcomes, which will in turn affect the migration 
and education decisions of next generations. At the other extreme of the spectrum, global 
                                                 
1 Bhagwati and Hamada (1974). 
2 Docquier and Marfouk (2006). 
3 See Ozzden and Schiff (2006) for a compilation of contributions on these topics. 
4 World Bank (2006).  
5 See Chami et al. (2008) and Beine et al. (2001). 
6 Throughout this note, remittances are defined as the sum of transfers and capital flows influenced by 
emigration flows. 
  2models are by nature too general to accurately reflect countries’ specific structural 
characteristics, such as education systems, migration and demographic patterns, exposure 
to foreign competition or the international mobility of factors. Finally, estimated reduced 
forms cannot disentangle the different effects at play (not to mention senses of causality), 
prompting criticism on the meaning and interpretation of the results obtained.
7  
In turn, policy recommendations derived from such studies might suffer from 
various shortcomings, when envisaging the regulation of migration flows as an 
instrument of economic development. Symmetrically, general development policies 
ignoring their likely impact on migration flows could possibly produce sub-optimal 
outcomes. 
Thus, this paper attempts to fill in some ways these gaps, through the building of 
a generic economy-wide dynamic computable general equilibrium model capturing 
important migration-related features. In particular, the model allows for endogenous 
education and migration decisions, the latter also influencing the amount of remittances 
towards the source country. Another important feature is the consideration of the 
education sector as a specific sector, producing graduates with skilled labor (teachers). 
This feature, often overlooked in the literature, could be important if one admits that 
education decisions are not only based on returns, but also on education costs.  
In turn, we use this model over a 25-year period to identify conditions for the 
existence of net brain gain– i.e., higher domestic accumulation of human capital (in per 
capita terms) with higher skilled migration. Such gains would be generated through 
second order effects, namely (i) greater incentives to invest in education (the result of 
higher returns with higher migration possibilities) and (ii) higher investment capacities 
with higher remittances.
8 Various factors are theoretically candidates to generate or 
amplify brain gain: high ratio of remittances over domestic incomes, high dependency 
ratios in migrant households, low dependency ratios in source countries, increasing 
returns to scale in the education sector, technological transfers and export market access 
with Diasporas, and efficient financial markets.  
                                                 
7 Lucas (2003). 
8 See Mountford (1997) and Beine et al. (2008) on the brain gain literature.  
  3Our results suggest that while certain structural parameters can favor 
simultaneously domestic human capital accumulation and skilled migration, this should 
nevertheless not prompt to conclude that higher migration necessarily encourage the 
constitution of higher stocks of human capital in source countries. Indeed, we cannot 
find, within the realms of likelihood, any conditions within which a change in migration 
possibilities alone results in higher net accumulation of human capital. Rather, the 
combination of high migration and high human capital accumulation patterns are due to 
third factors, and the conclusions obtained from cross-country analysis
9 should thus be 
interpreted with caution when used for policy making. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the model and 
Section III assesses the impact of various parameters on the likelihood of brain gain. 
Section IV concludes.  
 
II. Modeling Migration and Education Decisions 
To frame the migration-education nexus, we consider a small open economy in 
which agents make simultaneous decisions on education and migration based on 
contemporary information and assets. Our variable of interest is the domestic 
accumulation of human capital per capita, a major – if not the most important - driver of 
development. As embodied in persons, human capital is assumed to be imperfectly 
mobile across countries, as is physical capital. The latter is internationally mobile in the 
form of investment flows, but becomes immobile once installed.  
Education investment decisions here refer to those allowing the acquisition of 
sufficient skills to migrate or fulfill domestic skilled jobs. In our framework, we assume 




In logarithmic approximation, the per capita domestic accumulation of human 
capital h can be written as: 
                                                 
9 See Beine et al. (2008) for instance on the empirical impact of migration on human capital accumulation.  
10 Alternatively, such expenditures could be financed by public authorities to respond to citizens needs. 
Given the fact that our model comprises only one representative household financing the government, this 
would not make any difference as long as the government reacts to the same signals to make its investment 
decisions. This is obviously not always or everywhere true, but this political economy dimension goes 
beyond the scope of this paper and would only complicate the discussion. See Docquier et al. (2008) for a 
discussion on the interaction between public expenditures in education and migration. 
  4h = e – m – n (1) 
where e is the growth rate in the net supply of skilled workers – the output of the tertiary 
education system
11, m is the share of skilled workers emigrating, and n the population 
growth rate. e and m are not independent: e results, for a given production function of the 
education system, from investments in tertiary education, which are influenced by 
migration. Indeed, both households’ income and investment rate in education (whose 
multiplication equals investment in tertiary education) react to changes in migration 
patterns. 
Households’ incomes are directly influenced by migration through various 
channels. First order effects include the difference between remittances received from the 
Diaspora (the cumulated sum of past migrations flows) and foregone domestic incomes 
from households’ members migrating. Second order effects include the macro-economic 
effects of migration on households’ income through changes in relative prices (factors 
prices, real exchange rate). Further, the share of households’ income invested in 
education also depends on migration, through its effects on (i) the remuneration of human 
capital and (ii) the cost of education. Higher migration possibilities raise the expected 
remuneration of skilled labor if migration results from a difference in labor remuneration 
between domestic and foreign markets (Mountford, 1997). Moreover, if migration is not 
accompanied with a matching declining domestic demand for skilled labor, the lower 
supply of skilled labor will raise its relative price. Besides, the cost of education depends 
to a great extent on the price of its main input, teachers, whose remuneration evolves in 
line with that of skilled labor.  
The population growth rate, n, is obviously not independent from the migration 
rate m, since the departure of migrant workers and their dependents mechanically 
diminish the population size.
12  
Thus, Equation (1) can be re-written as:  
h(m) = e(m) – m – n(m) (2) 
                                                 
11 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the retirement rate of domestic skilled workers is exogenous. 
12 In the long run, the migration rate also structurally affects the natural rate of growth of the population, 
through its effect on masculinity and fertility rates, see Annex 2. Our calculations, not reported in the paper, 
nevertheless suggest that the impact of migration on the natural rate of population growth is not to be felt 
within the 25-year period of simulation.  
  5so as to reflect the influence of migration on skilled labor supply and population growth 
rates, and a brain gain would occur if an increase in the migration rate from m to m’ is 
such that: 
h(m’) > h(m)     or equivalently        [e(m’) – n(m’)] – [e(m) – n(m)] > m’ – m  (3) 
In others words, a brain gain occur if the migration-induced change in the per 
capita supply of skilled workers growth rate exceeds the change in the migration rate 
itself. But the response of the former variables to migration is not trivial, as discussed 
above. Thus, in order to analyze the various interactions between education and 
migration, we develop a generic general equilibrium (GE) model, and use it as a 
laboratory to test the impact of various conditions (parameters) on the possibility to 
generate brain gain.  
The CE model developed for this study is a typical dynamic-recursive 
neoclassical model with endogenous prices, market clearing (on both goods and factors 
markets), and imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Its specificity 
comes from the fact that physical and education investment decisions, migration and 
related remittances are all treated as endogenous variables. Another important feature is 
the treatment of the education sector as a specific sector, producing graduates mostly with 
skilled labor (teachers). Other features of the model are more common to the GE 
literature, and discussed below in non-mathematical terms. 
13 
Sectors’ supply is modeled using nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
functions, which describe the substitution and complement relations among the various 
inputs. Producers are cost-minimizers and constant return to scale is assumed in all 
sectors, including education
14. Output results from two composite goods: intermediate 
consumption and value added, with low substitution possibility between the two. The 
intermediate aggregate is obtained by combining all products in fixed proportions. The 
value-added is decomposed in three substitutable parts: skilled labor, unskilled labor, and 
capital, all of which are fully employed. The degree of substitutability between these 
three factors of production is set to unity.
15   
                                                 
13 See Beghin et al. (2002) for a mathematical discussion of this class of models. 
14 This assumption is relaxed in the next section, to analyze the impact of increasing returns to scale in the 
education sector on the possibility of net brain gain.  
15 The production function is therefore similar to a Cobb-Douglas. 
  6Income from labor and capital accrue to the representative household. 
Households’ total disposable income (the sum of factors’ incomes and remittances
16 
minus direct taxes and social contributions) is allocated to consumption and savings using 
the Extended Linear Expenditure System (ELES) specification. This specification allows 
for the existence of incompressible per capita levels of consumption (e.g. basic education 
for the youth, health education for the elderly) of the different products. In turn, 
dependency ratios influence households’ savings rate: the higher the former, the lower 
the latter. 
Once their total value is determined (see below), government and investment 
demands are disaggregated into demands for products and services at the sector level 
according to fixed coefficient functions.
17  
Import demand results from a CES aggregation function of domestic and 
imported goods. Export supply is symmetrically modeled as a Constant Elasticity of 
Transformation (CET) function. Producers decide to allocate their output to domestic or 
foreign markets in response to relative prices. This last rule similarly applies for 
migration decisions: workers (both skilled and unskilled) arbitrate between the decision 
to migrate or stay home depending on the differential between real foreign and domestic 
labor remunerations, with imperfect substitution between the two reflecting preferences 
and migration costs.  
Several macro-economic constraints are introduced in this model:  
First, the small country assumption holds: thus, imports and exports prices on 
world markets are exogenous, as is the foreign remuneration of labor for migrants. 
Capital flows are endogenous and reactive to the remuneration of aggregate capital 
(human and physical) over its replacement cost, see below, plus some exogenous trends 
reflecting the growth in world’s savings. Remittances are determined in proportion of the 
Diaspora’s income (with a growth in remunerations abroad set exogenously), and hence 
the trade balance (exports minus imports) is also endogenous to insure the equilibrium of 
                                                 
16 Thus, remittances are fully fungible with other sources of income, as not assigned to any particular use.  
17 Typically, government expenditures are constituted of government services (other services), investment 
expenditures in physical capital of equipment goods (industry) and construction services (other services), 
while investment expenditures in human capital only comprise education services. The latter, to deliver its 
services, employs mostly skilled labor (teachers), whose wage bill constitute half of total production costs 
in the education sector (and 3/5 of its value added). See the Social Accounting Matrix in Annex 1. 
  7the balance of payments.
18 The size of the Diaspora is the sum of cumulated past 
migration flows, with a depreciation factor reflecting migrants’ progressive disconnection 
with their country of origin.
19  
Second, the model imposes fixed real public expenditures and savings, to reflect 
the government’s choice of delivering a given amount and quality of public services and 
ability to borrow. Public receipts thus adjust endogenously to achieve the predetermined 
government net position, through a change in net transfer from households to 
government.
20  
Third, investment is determined by the availability of savings, the latter 
originating from households, government and abroad. The model’s endogenous growth 
dynamics results from this closure rule. A change in savings influences accumulation of 
physical and human capital in the following period. Savings are (myopically) invested in 
human or physical capital depending on their relative remunerations over replacement 
costs (respectively the price of education services and investment goods), or Tobin’s Q-
ratios. The remuneration of human capital retained by agents to make their choice is the 
average of foreign and domestic remuneration of skilled labor weighted by the migration 
rate. From a functional standpoint, investment decision is modeled using a CES function, 
which captures the choice for households to invest either in physical or human capital.  
The availability of skilled and unskilled workers at any given period of time is 
determined by educational investment decisions made in earlier periods and demographic 
trends. Contemporaneous decisions to migrate eventually determine the supply and use of 
domestic labor for domestic economic activities. The stock of physical capital is 
determined by the sum of past investment expenditures, minus some depreciation, 
through the perpetual inventory method.  
 
                                                 
18 Foreign reserves are assumed constant and the nominal exchange rate is the numeraire of the model. 
19 We assume that all migrants – skilled or unskilled - severe ties with their country of origin after 50 years. 
Although it is likely that skilled workers’ remuneration abroad exceeds that of unskilled workers abroad, 
we assume that the former do not remit more than the latter. Hence the change in the composition of the 
stock of migrants between skilled and unskilled has no impact on the level of remittances.  
20 In real life, this offsetting mechanism does not exist, and other fiscal instruments must be used such as 
indirect or direct taxes. But this type of modeling is interesting from an analytical perspective as a net 
transfer to household is considered to be the less distortionary fiscal instrument. Hence the analysis of any 
given tax reform is not complicated by the effect of replacing it with another distortionary one. 
  8III. Results  
 The generic model is used in this section as a laboratory to explore the migration-
education nexus in general, and the likelihood for net brain gain in different settings in 
particular. As a first step, we calibrate the model with parameters describing what could 
possibly be an ‘average’ or ‘stylized’ developing economy. The calibration necessitates 
three set of parameters: (i) a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), which portrays the main 
economic flows between the different agents at one point in time, (ii) some behavioral 
parameters (such as elasticities of substitution), and (iii) some exogenous variables.  
The SAM is reported in Annex 1. It portrays a developing economy which 
produces agricultural goods, industrial goods, education, and other services, with 
intermediate inputs, capital, unskilled and skilled labor. All sectors but education are in 
competition with the rest of the world on both imports and exports markets. Imports 
exceed exports (40 vs. 32.5 percent of GDP) and the trade balance is financed with 
remittances (7.5 percent of GDP). The latter goes directly to the representative 
household, to complement his labor and capital incomes. The household consumes the 
equivalent of two-thirds of GDP, pays direct taxes (10 percent of GDP), and saves the 
remainder to invest in physical capital (20 percent of GDP) and tertiary education (2 
percent of GDP). One year of tertiary education costs the equivalent of the GDP per 
capita for each student and one-sixth of the pool of students graduates each year, once 
accounted for total duration of tertiary studies, repetitions and drop-outs. One-fifth of the 
cohort aged 15-19 is at the university. The government finances primary and secondary 
education, for 4 percent of GDP. 
The country is in the midst of its demographic transition (a natural growth rate of 
2 percent per year and a dependency ratio of 2:5 between active and total populations), 
and initially records migration rates equivalent to 1 percent of total labor supply (and a 
bit less than 1 percent of total population, see below). One third of active migrants are 
skilled workers and the same proportion of skilled workers is to be found in the active 
Diaspora. The latter, including dependents, represents 7.5 percent of the country’s 
population. Thus, each member of the Diaspora remits the equivalent of the GDP per 
capita in the source country. 
  9World prices of goods and services stay unchanged throughout the 25-year 
simulation period, but for skilled workers, who see their real international remuneration 
increase by 3 percent annually. The physical capital stock is twice the GDP in the first 
period, and depreciates by 5 percent every year. The initial proportion of skilled workers 
in labor supply is set to 1:5, and the education premium per year of additional schooling 
to 10 percent. 
Would-be migrants react modestly to changes in relative remunerations between 
their source country and the rest of the world. A 10 percent increase in the wedge 
between domestic and foreign remuneration increases the flow of migrants by 2 percent. 
Agents also react moderately to changes in physical vs. human capital returns over their 
costs. A 10 percent increase in the wedge between physical and human capital 
remuneration increases the share of savings invested in physical capital by 5 percentage 




We simulate this stylized economy over a 25-year period (S1). Its GDP grows by 
3.4 percent every year. Its population, once accounting for emigration, effectively grows 
at the average rate of 1.2 percent. Sustained with growing remittances and declining 
dependency ratios, investments in both physical and human capital grow more rapidly 
(5.1 and 5.6 percent respectively) than GDP. Workers get more educated and more 
productive with higher physical capital. The greater supply of skilled workers reduces the 
skill premium, and thus relative education costs. The share of skilled workers migrating 
increases (from 2.3 percent initially to 2.7 percent by the end of the 25-year period), 
though not sufficiently to affect the share of skilled workers staying in the country in 
proportion of total population, which roughly doubles in 25 years, from 5.5 to 10.0 
percent. Therefore, increased migration rates of skilled workers are accompanied in the 




                                                 
21 Given the low level of product disaggregation (4 products), elasticities of substitution between domestic 
and foreign goods are assumed moderate, at 2.0 for both imports and exports. See McDaniel and Balistreri 
(2003). 








Annual growth rates 
Population 1.2% 1.1%  1.1%
Real Gross Domestic Product  3.4% 3.3%  3.2%
Per capita real disposable income  2.7% 2.8%  2.8%
Per capita domestic human capital  2.5% 2.2%  1.8%
     
Real physical investment  5.1% 5.1%  5.0%
Real educational investment   5.9% 6.0%  6.1%
     
Labor supply, unskilled  1.1% 1.1%  1.1%
Labor supply, skilled  3.7% 3.4%  3.0%
     
Wage, unskilled  2.4% 2.4%  2.4%
Wage, skilled  0.0% 0.4%  1.0%
Physical capital remuneration  -1.6% -1.6%  -1.6%
Educational investment costs  0.1% 0.4%  0.7%
Physical investment costs  0.1% 0.1%  0.2%
Consumer price index  0.1% 0.2%  0.2%
Others 
Proportion of domestic skilled workers after 25 years   10.0% 9.2%  8.4%
Skilled workers migration rate after 25 years  2.7% 4.2%  6.1%
Elasticity of per capita domestic human capital accumulation to skilled migration  -0.54 
*Unless otherwise specified. Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
This conjunction of events, which can be very robust as we will see below, does 
not, however, necessarily reflect a causal relationship from migration to human capital 
accumulation. This hypothesis is tested by raising, in a second and third simulations (S2, 
S3) migration possibilities (multiplying the substitution elasticity by 5 and 10, for both 
skilled and unskilled workers, from 0.2 to 1 and then 2), leaving everything else 
unchanged. As a result, migration flows grow more rapidly, as do per capita education 
expenditures under the influence of higher remittances and higher wages for skilled 
workers. Per capita disposable incomes grow more rapidly as well, and thus increased 
migration can be considered as welfare improving for both migrants (as pulled by greater 
income opportunities abroad) and households staying in the country.  
But these second-order effects are nevertheless insufficient to offset the direct 
(first-order effect) loss of skilled workers. A 3.4 percentage point increase in the 
migration rate results in a 1.6 percentage point decrease in the proportion of skilled 
workers in the population after 25 years. Another measure of the same phenomenon is the 
  11elasticity of per capita domestic human capital accumulation to the average skilled 
migration rate which is negative, at -0.5. 
Various factors indeed reduce the possibility for net brain gain, including 
increased education costs (with higher wages for skilled workers), increased dependency 
ratios (as migrants leave with less dependents), and insufficient increases in savings, 
which all contribute to make additional education expenditures insufficient to replace 
foregone skilled workers. As a matter of fact, educating new students to replace skilled 
workers migrating with higher migration possibilities (S3 vs. S1) would require raising 
further education expenditure by approximately a third. By the end of the simulation 
period, this would mean an additional 1 percentage point of GDP to train another 1 
percent of the total population.   
 
Chart 1: The simulated impact of increased skilled migration on domestic human capital 










































Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
The results discussed above obviously depend on the choice of initial conditions 
(SAMs) and behavioral parameters retained. In the next paragraphs, we vary a number of 
parameters to create the conditions for net brain gain, and discuss the likelihood of such 
parameters.  
These varying parameters are of different nature. Some reflect different “states of 
the world”, or conditions in countries receiving migrants. This is for instance the case for 
higher remittances per migrant - which could reflect larger income gap between source 
and destination countries; or higher dependency ratios in migrant households – reflecting 
more open immigration policies in destination countries; or the capacity of Diaspora to 
  12initiate technology transfers and to provide greater market access for source countries’ 
exports. These different external conditions can also be influenced at the margin by 
policies: reduction in remittances fees, reunion policies, circular migration agreements or 
the development of institutional business links between the Diaspora and the source 
countries. Others reflect a different position of the source country on the path of 
development and demographic transition. Finally, some reflect different conditions in 
source countries, education and financial systems in particular (on which policies can 
have influence), as well as investment behaviors. 
 
Higher Remittances per Diaspora Member 
In baseline simulations, initial remittances per Diaspora member equal GDP per 
capita in the source country (and two-fifth of the GDP per worker in the source country). 
This amount is also equal to the cost necessary to finance one year of tertiary education 
per student. As GDP per capita in developed countries is 18 times higher at market 
exchange rates than that of developing countries (low and middle income countries)
22, 
this also basically means that each Diaspora member remits 1:18 of its income to his 
country of origin. In the next simulations (S1r, S2r, S3r), we multiply this amount by 2 
(thus, remittances would represent 15 percent of GDP in the initial years of simulation).
 
Indeed, the impact of increased migration on human capital accumulation could possibly 
be much higher if remittances per migrant were higher. From a policy perspective, such a 
move could be encouraged by the reduction of remittances fees.
23  
Comparing the new set of simulations S1r, S2r and S3r (where migration 
possibilities are progressively raised like in the previous section, accounting for higher 
remittances per migrant) with baseline simulations (S1, S2, and S3) suggest that higher 
remittances can significantly raise simultaneously incomes, per capita education 
expenditures and skilled migration rates. But, within this setting, raising possibilities to 
migrate (comparing S1r with S2r and with S3r) does not lead to a net domestic 
accumulation of human capital. On the contrary, the proportion of domestic skilled 
workers in the population declines. Indeed, higher remittances raise households’ capacity 
                                                 
22 See World Bank (2008). The ratios of GDP per capita between high income countries and middle income 
countries is 1:12, and 1:56 between high income countries and low income countries. 
23 See World Bank (2006) for a discussion of remittance fees and ways to reduce them. 
  13to respond to higher foreign demand for skilled workers as they have the financial ability 
to invest more in education. In contrast, the domestic demand for skilled labor declines 
with higher migration possibilities (but in the education sector), as its relative cost 
increases in comparison with physical capital and unskilled labor. Besides, higher 
remittances affect export competitiveness through a real exchange rate appreciation and 
the overall demand for domestic goods and services.  
 








Annual growth rates 
Population 1.2% 1.1%  1.0%
Real Gross Domestic Product  3.9% 3.9%  3.8%
Per capita real disposable income  3.5% 3.6%  3.8%
Per capita domestic human capital  3.5% 3.2%  2.8%
     
Real physical investment  5.9% 5.9%  6.0%
Real educational investment   6.8% 7.0%  7.2%
     
Labor supply, unskilled  0.8% 0.7%  0.7%
Labor supply, skilled  4.7% 4.4%  4.0%
     
Wage, unskilled  3.4% 3.4%  3.5%
Wage, skilled  -0.3% 0.2%  0.8%
Physical capital remuneration  -2.0% -2.0%  -1.9%
Educational investment costs  0.1% 0.4%  0.8%
Physical investment costs  0.2% 0.3%  0.4%
Consumer price index  0.2% 0.3%  0.4%
Others 
Proportion of domestic skilled workers after 25 years   12.7% 11.8%  10.9%
Skilled workers migration rate after 25 years  2.5% 3.1%  3.9%
Elasticity of per capita domestic human capital accumulation to skilled migration  -0.46 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
Raising further remittances per migrant in proportion of GDP per capita (to a ratio 
of 4:1 for instance) only marginally affects the picture without changing the overall 
conclusion. Raising further remittances also becomes questionable from a likelihood 
perspective. Indeed, at 4 times GDP per capita, migrants from developing to developed 
countries would broadly remit a quarter of their incomes, and much more if initially 
originating from middle-income countries. Another possibility for higher remittances is 
the existence of a much larger initial Diaspora. But it would also induce a lower impact 
  14of migration on additional remittances, as new migration flows would have a lower 
marginal impact on the size of the Diaspora. 
 
Higher Migrants’ Dependency Ratios 
In baseline simulations, the dependency ratio of migrant households is assumed 
lower than the source country average dependency ratio
24. Indeed, migrants are (in our 
framework) all active, and migrate before the end of their fertility period. Thus, migration 
per se raises dependency ratios, with a negative impact on per capita incomes and 
education expenditures. In the next simulations, we equalize migrants’ dependency ratios 
with source country average dependency ratios. Given exogenous demographic trends, 
households (migrating or not) dependency ratios tend to decline progressively over the 
25-year simulation period, from 2.44 to 2.24, mirroring progress achieved on the path of 
demographic transition. From a policy perspective, equalizing dependency ratios could be 
favored by family reunion policies. 
Comparing the new set of simulations S1d, S2d and S3d (where migration 
possibilities are progressively raised like in the previous sections, accounting for higher 
migrants’ dependency ratios) with baseline simulations (S1, S2, and S3) suggest that 
higher dependency ratios in migrants’ households marginally favor the per capita 
domestic accumulation of human capital. But, within this setting, raising possibilities to 
migrate (comparing S1m with S2m and with S3m) does not lead to a net domestic 
accumulation of human capital. While higher migrants’ dependency ratios increase per 
capita human capital levels, they do not affect the response of domestic human capital 
accumulation to increased migration possibilities. This is notably reflected in the fact that 
elasticities of domestic human capital accumulation with respect to skilled migration 







                                                 
24 Migrants’ dependency ratios (total over active population) stand at 1.8 in initial years, against 2.4 for 
non-migrant households. In other words, migrant couples have 1.6 children when leaving the country, 
against 2.8 children for couples staying in the country at the end of their period of fertility. 








Annual growth rates 
Population 0.9% 0.8%  0.7%
Real Gross Domestic Product  3.5% 3.4%  3.3%
Per capita real disposable income  3.1% 3.2%  3.2%
Per capita domestic human capital  2.9% 2.6%  2.2%
     
Real physical investment  5.2% 5.2%  5.2%
Real educational investment   6.1% 6.2%  6.3%
     
Labor supply, unskilled  1.1% 1.1%  1.0%
Labor supply, skilled  3.8% 3.5%  3.1%
     
Wage, unskilled  2.4% 2.4%  2.4%
Wage, skilled  -0.1% 0.4%  0.9%
Physical capital remuneration  -1.7% -1.7%  -1.7%
Educational investment costs  0.1% 0.4%  0.6%
Physical investment costs  0.1% 0.1%  0.2%
Consumer price index  0.1% 0.2%  0.2%
Others 
Proportion of domestic skilled workers after 25 years   11.0% 10.3%  9.4%
Skilled workers migration rate after 25 years  2.5% 3.1%  3.8%
Elasticity of per capita domestic human capital accumulation to skilled migration  -0.48 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
Raising further the dependency ratio of migrant families – that is, beyond the 
source country average – could be theoretically envisaged. Yet, within reasonable limits, 
results suggest that higher dependency ratios in migrant families would only marginally 
improve the response of domestic human capital accumulation to migration, without 
changing its sign.  
 
Lower Dependency Ratios in the Source Country 
  Net brain gain is predicated on the possibility for residents to invest more in 
education, in response to better incentives (higher return on education) and higher 
savings with remittances. Such a propensity to invest depends in turn on the share of 
disposable income which is not allocated to incompressible consumption, and thus on the 
dependency ratio: the lower this ratio, the higher the propensity to reap emerging 
investment opportunities in human capital. 
In the next simulations, we advance further the position of our average economy 
on the path of demographic transition (see Annex 2). As such, dependency ratios are 
  16lower (starting at 2.15, against 2.44 in baseline simulations), and slowly increase over the 
simulation period as the country is aging. As more advanced in its demographic 
transition, the population also grows naturally less rapidly. For similar educational 
investments (in proportion of GDP), the country is able to educate a larger share of its 
population, given lower demographic pressures.  
Thus, comparing the new set of simulations S1a, S2a and S3a (where migration 
possibilities are progressively raised like in the previous sections, accounting for lower 
dependency ratios) with baseline simulations (S1, S2, and S3) suggest that advanced 
demographic transition favors both domestic accumulation of human capital and skilled 
migration. But here again, we can observe that higher migration possibilities (comparing 
S1a with S2a and S3a) tend to affect negatively the domestic accumulation of domestic 
capital. Compared with baseline simulations, the response of educational investment to 
skilled wages is slightly higher, yet far from sufficient to offset the loss of skilled workers 
migrating. 
 








Annual growth rates 
Population -0.7% -0.9%  -1.0%
Real Gross Domestic Product  1.8% 1.7%  1.6%
Per capita real disposable income  3.3% 3.4%  3.5%
Per capita domestic human capital  3.5% 3.1%  2.6%
     
Real physical investment  3.8% 3.8%  3.7%
Real educational investment   4.9% 5.0%  5.2%
     
Labor supply, unskilled  -1.9% -1.9%  -2.0%
Labor supply, skilled  2.8% 2.3%  1.8%
     
Wage, unskilled  3.9% 3.9%  3.9%
Wage, skilled  -0.6% 0.1%  0.9%
Physical capital remuneration  -2.4% -2.4%  -2.4%
Educational investment costs  0.0% 0.4%  0.8%
Physical investment costs  0.2% 0.3%  0.3%
Consumer price index  0.2% 0.3%  0.4%
Others 
Proportion of domestic skilled workers after 25 years   14.4% 13.0%  11.6%
Skilled workers migration rate after 25 years  2.8% 3.6%  4.6%
Elasticity of per capita domestic human capital accumulation to skilled migration  -0.50 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Increasing Returns to Scale in the Education Sector 
One underlying theoretical condition often retained to justify the existence of net 
brain gain is the existence of increasing returns to scale in the education sector. Indeed, 
increased migration possibilities can be seen as a substitute to direct subsidies to reap the 
latent positive externalities stemming from a larger pool stock of human capital in the 
country and in the education sector (Stark and Wang, 2002). 
In baseline simulations, constant returns to scale are assumed in all sectors of 
production, including education services. In other words, doubling education 
expenditures doubles the number of students graduating. We relax this assumption in the 
next paragraphs by assuming that doubling education expenditures would triple the 
number of students graduating. Thus, marginal costs of education are decreasing and 
higher migration possibilities could favor the emergence of net brain gain. 
Comparing the new set of simulations S1e, S2e and S3e (where migration 
possibilities are progressively raised like in the previous sections, accounting for 
increasing returns to scale in education) with baseline simulations S1, S2 and S3 suggest 
that decreasing education costs significantly encourage the domestic accumulation of 
human capital, as well as the proportion of skilled workers migrating. But, within this 
setting, raising possibilities to migrate (comparing S1e with S2e and with S3e) does not 
lead to a net domestic accumulation of human capital, even if the likelihood of net brain 
gain slightly increases in comparison with baseline simulations (as reflected with higher 
elasticities). Indeed, productivity gains in the education sector allow producing more 
graduates with less teachers, thus exerting a strong downward pressure on skilled wages, 
as the local demand for skilled workers does not increase in similar proportions. Such a 
pressure is relieved with greater migration possibilities, for a significantly negative net 















Annual growth rates 
Population 1.2% 1.0%  0.9%
Real Gross Domestic Product  3.5% 3.4%  3.2%
Per capita real disposable income  2.9% 3.0%  3.2%
Per capita domestic human capital  4.1% 3.7%  3.2%
     
Real physical investment  5.3% 5.3%  5.3%
Real educational investment   5.8% 6.0%  6.2%
     
Labor supply, unskilled  0.5% 0.4%  0.3%
Labor supply, skilled  5.3% 4.9%  4.3%
     
Wage, unskilled  3.0% 3.1%  3.2%
Wage, skilled  -1.8% -1.1%  -0.3%
Physical capital remuneration  -1.7% -1.7%  -1.7%
Educational investment costs -0.6% -0.3%  0.2%
Physical investment costs  0.1% 0.2%  0.3%
Consumer price index  0.1% 0.2%  0.3%
Others 
Proportion of domestic skilled workers after 25 years   14.7% 13.4%  11.8%
Skilled workers migration rate after 25 years  2.5% 3.5%  4.9%
Elasticity of per capita domestic human capital accumulation to skilled migration  -0.40 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
Technological Transfers and Export Market Access with Diasporas 
The literature on migration underlines the likely influence of Diasporas to 
facilitate the transfer of technologies to the source country and develop export markets 
abroad (see Kapur, 2001). Indeed, the presence of skilled migrants abroad can facilitate 
the identification of technological and business opportunities.  
This mechanism is considered in the next simulations, where we let the price of 
imported equipment goods (in which new technologies are embodied), and the export 
price at which the source country can sell its product abroad respectively decline and 
increase with a larger Diaspora of skilled workers. 
Comparing the new set of simulations S1t, S2t and S3t (where migration 
possibilities are progressively raised like in the previous sections, accounting for the 
impact of Diasporas on the terms of trade) with baseline simulations S1, S2 and S3 
suggest that the influence of skilled Diasporas on the terms of trade significantly 
encourage the domestic accumulation of human capital, while it reduces migration 
  19pressures. Technological transfers and greater access to export markets indeed improve 
domestic business opportunities and raise the demand for skilled workers locally. Yet, 
within this setting, raising possibilities to migrate (comparing S1t with S2t and with S3t) 
does not lead to a net domestic accumulation of human capital. 
 








Annual growth rates 
Population 1.2% 1.2%  1.1%
Real Gross Domestic Product  3.6% 3.6%  3.5%
Per capita real disposable income  3.2% 3.3%  3.4%
Per capita domestic human capital  2.7% 2.5%  2.2%
     
Real physical investment  5.7% 5.8%  5.8%
Real educational investment   6.5% 6.6%  6.7%
     
Labor supply, unskilled  1.0% 1.0%  1.0%
Labor supply, skilled  4.0% 3.7%  3.4%
     
Wage, unskilled  3.0% 3.1%  3.2%
Wage, skilled  0.3% 0.8%  1.3%
Physical capital remuneration  -1.4% -1.4%  -1.3%
Educational investment costs  0.5% 0.8%  1.0%
Physical investment costs  0.1% 0.2%  0.2%
Consumer price index  0.2% 0.3%  0.3%
Others 
Proportion of domestic skilled workers after 25 years   10.7% 10.1%  9.4%
Skilled workers migration rate after 25 years  2.4% 3.0%  3.6%
Elasticity of per capita domestic human capital accumulation to skilled migration  -0.48 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
Could this mechanism be pushed further to generate net brain gain? In the 
previous simulations, we assumed that a 10 percent increase in the size of the Diaspora 
would lead to a 1 percent change in the prices of imports and exports faced by the source 
country. This in turn means that raising migration possibilities (from S1e to S3e) would 
induce an increase (decrease) of 3 percent in the price of exports (imports) for a Diaspora 
30 percent higher after 25 years. Interestingly, pushing further this mechanism (using 
elasticities 3 times higher for the response of technological transfers to the diaspora size) 
lowers elasticities of domestic human capital accumulation to skilled migration by a 
  20quarter, yet quite insufficiently to generate net brain gain. Furthermore, it induces 
unrealistically high terms of trade gains for a small change in skilled migration.
25  
 
Greater Financial Market Efficiency 
Another important dimension in the brain gain literature is the existence of 
financial constraints – or imperfect financial markets – preventing agents to meet the 
investment opportunities they identify (Beine et al. 2008). This concerns notably 
education investments in response to emerging migration possibilities.  
In the next simulations, we relax this constraint by raising by 4 (from 0.5 to 2) the 
elasticity of substitution between investment types (physical vs. human capital), 
depending on remunerations over replacement costs. As such, we analyze here the impact 
of a first order effect, i.e. the direct response of education expenditures to changes in the 
remuneration of human capital.  
Comparing the new set of simulations S1f, S2f and S3f (where migration 
possibilities are progressively raised like in the previous sections, accounting for more 
efficient financial markets) with baseline simulations S1, S2 and S3 suggest that the 
improved savings’ allocative efficiency significantly encourage the domestic 
accumulation of human capital, as well as the migration of skilled workers. But again, 
within this setting, raising the possibilities to migrate (comparing S1f with S2f and with 
S3f) does not lead to a net domestic accumulation of human capital, even if the net brain 
loss is slightly lower than in baseline simulations. This is reflected in higher (but still 
negative) elasticities of domestic human capital accumulation with respect to skilled 







                                                 
25 For instance, with elasticities set at 0.3, an increase in skilled migration rates from 2.6 to 4.5 percent 
already generates a 13 percent gain in the terms of trade. Such a gain is equivalent to 6.5 percent of GDP. 
In comparison, higher remittances with higher skilled migration generate a gain of less than 2 percent.  








Annual growth rates 
Population 1.2% 1.1%  0.9%
Real Gross Domestic Product  3.4% 3.2%  3.1%
Per capita real disposable income  2.7% 2.8%  2.9%
Per capita domestic human capital  3.4% 3.2%  2.8%
     
Real physical investment  4.9% 4.8%  4.7%
Real educational investment   7.2% 7.6%  8.2%
     
Labor supply, unskilled  0.8% 0.7%  0.6%
Labor supply, skilled  4.6% 4.4%  4.0%
     
Wage, unskilled  2.6% 2.7%  2.8%
Wage, skilled  -0.9% -0.4%  0.2%
Physical capital remuneration  -1.5% -1.5%  -1.5%
Educational investment costs  -0.3% 0.0%  0.4%
Physical investment costs  0.1% 0.2%  0.3%
Consumer price index  0.1% 0.2%  0.3%
Others 
Proportion of domestic skilled workers after 25 years   12.5% 11.8%  10.8%
Skilled workers migration rate after 25 years  2.5% 3.3%  4.5%
Elasticity of per capita domestic human capital accumulation to skilled migration  -0.31
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
Naturally, given its first order nature, pushing further this mechanism ends up 
generating net brain gain when the elasticity of substitution between investment types 
exceeds 5 - that is, when a 10 percent increase in the relative remuneration of education 
over physical investment generates a 50 percent increase in education expenditures. This 
is indeed the amount required to compensate the departure of skilled migrants with new 
students, as discussed with baseline simulations
26. 
Is this realistic to envisage such a case? Probably not, given the inertia observed 
in the allocation of savings across investment types. On the one hand, young students are 
typically discriminated on developing countries’ financial markets (given their lack of 
collaterals), which casts doubts on the eagerness of banks to sharply increase tuition 
credits when the increase in skilled workers remuneration is associated with much higher 
migration (as it further lowers possibility for banks to recover their loans). On the other 
                                                 
26 The remuneration of skilled labor over its cost is 10 percent higher in S3 than in S1. And a 50 percent 
increase in education expenditure was estimated to be required to compensate for the drain of skilled 
workers. 
  22hand, if financed through public subsidies, college tuitions will also be at risk with higher 
migration, as the tax basis (GDP and imports) shrink with lower populations - thus the 
difficulty for the government to sharply increase public tertiary education expenditures 
when migration accelerates. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Our laboratory investigation gives little support to the view that second order 
effects could realistically compensate the (first order effect) loss of skilled workers 
migrating, as far as domestic human capital is concerned. Indeed, greater incentives and 
financial capacity to invest in education are likely to be insufficient to replace foregone 
skilled workers. The (mere) evidence of net brain drain recorded in some countries
27 is 
not likely to find its origin in general equilibrium effects, unless these effects materialize 
under extreme settings or behaviors. One of them stems from an extremely large response 
of human capital investment to its remuneration, probably mirroring myopic or risk prone 
investment behaviors. Furthermore, there possibly exist other second-order effects which 
could reduce the likelihood of brain gain: increased education costs with higher skilled 
wages; reduced domestic demand for skilled workers with the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. 
As such, increasing skilled migration possibilities alone is not likely to encourage 
higher accumulation of domestic human capital, even if it raises per capita incomes in 
source countries. But several complementary actions can be considered to improve the 
impact of skilled migration on the domestic accumulation of human capital, including in 
particular the mobilization of network economies with the Diaspora, the reduction of 
remittance fees, reunion family policies, the guarantee of college tuition loans, and 





                                                 
27 Chand and Clemens (2008) using treatment groups methods, observe the existence of net brain gain in 
Fiji. 
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Annex 1. The Stylized Social Accounting Matrix 
 
The SAM below portrays an imaginary “average” developing economy, with a GDP at market price equal to 100. Thus, its 
various cells can be interpreted as proportions of GDP. For instance, imports of manufactures (before tariffs) represent 35.7 percent of 
GDP. 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14 
1  Agriculture  1.0 8.0 0.1 0.0       5.7  0.0   0.0  0.0   3.1 
2  Manufactures 1.2  27.2  24.8 0.0        32.5 0.0   13.0  0.0   13.2 
3  Other Services  5.1  20.0 13.6  1.0        23.2 20.0   7.0  0.0   16.2 
4  Education  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0        4.0 0.0   0.0  2.0   0.0 
5  Unskilled  labor  3.1  6.0  25.1  1.0            
6  Skilled  labor  0.1  1.1  10.3  3.0            
7  Capital  3.8  8.7  30.8  1.0            
8  Household       35.2  14.4  40.4         7.5 
9  Government  0.1 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.0  0.0  3.9  10.0       4.4   
10  Savings          22.0  -14.0       5.0 
11  Physical  investment            20.0      
12  Education  investment            2.0      
13  Tariffs  0.2  4.3  0.0  0.0            
14  Rest of the World  3.4  35.7  0.9  0.0       5.0       
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
  26Annex 2. Migration and Demographic Patterns 
Beyond its direct effects on the size of the population, migration has long lasting 
indirect effects on the demographic dynamics, through changes in the age and gender 
structure that impact birth and mortality rates. 
Their magnitude depends both on the demographic structure of migrants (in and 
out migration, sex and age composition but also types of migration opposing permanent 
to temporary) and on the size of net migration flows in relation to the intensity of the 
domestic demographic dynamics.  
A simple demographic model was thus developed to account for these effects. In a 
long term perspective, the effects of migration add to (and interfere with) the 
demographic transition. Two main parameters have been retained to reflect such an 
interaction: the position of the “demographic cursor” with respect to the demographic 
transition and the intensity of migration. 
These two variables are, to a large extent, independent: the demographic cursor 
commands fertility and mortality rates for the concerned age and gender categories, while 
migration affects the percentage of individuals leaving (on a net basis) the country within 
each age and gender category. The age and gender characteristics retained for migrants 
focused on young, predominantly male migrants and the parameter “migration” was 
taken as a simple percentage of the basic pattern. The pace of the demographic transition 
was aligned with the median scenario of the UN population statistics database and values 
range from 0 to 1. The initial and final age structures for the population used in the model 
are presented below: 






Emigration rate for the workforce  1.00% 1.00% 
Demographic transition cursor (0% to 100%)  10% 75% 
Total emigration rate  0.49%  0.56% 
    
Natural rate of population growth  2.00%  0.26% 
Post migration rate of population growth  1.51%  -0.30% 
Natural rate of growth for the 15-64  2.01%  0.90% 
End of period share of 15-64  64.6%  62.3% 
Initial Share of 15-64 years  57.1%  65.4% 
Ratio active/dependent for the migrants  118.0% 128.9% 
Ratio active/dependent for the residents  90.4% 96.6% 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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